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The measurement problem is seen as an ambiguity of quantum mechanics, or, beyond that, as
a contradiction within the theory: Quantum mechanics offers two conflicting descriptions of the
Wigner’s-friend experiment. As we argue in this note there are, however, obstacles from within
quantum mechanics and regarding our perspective onto doing physics towards fully describing a
measurement. We conclude that the ability to exhaustively describe a measurement is an assumption
necessary for the common framing of the measurement problem and ensuing suggested solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
If one attempts to include observers into the quantum-
mechanical description, one encounters problems such as
the measurement problem [1, 2]. The Wigner’s-friend ex-
periment [3–5] is a manifestation thereof: Wigner mea-
sures his friend who, in turn, measures another sys-
tem. With appropriately chosen measurements, the
friend ends up being in a superposition of states after
his measurement. This is at odds with the idea that
measurements yield definite results. The definiteness is
commonly translated to the case of Wigner’s friend by
demanding that the joint system F ⊗ S collapses to one
of a number of orthogonal states representing different
measurement results. In order to obtain a formal contra-
diction, it is crucial to describe the friend’s measurement
by means of quantum mechanics. This amounts to the
following statement:
(A) For an observer O observing a result x when mea-
suring a system S, it is sufficient that O×S is in a
state φ for some φ ∈ HO ⊗HS .
The measurement problem in its usual reading results
from the discrepancy between φuni = Uφinit, i.e., the re-
sult of a unitary evolution U , and φcps, i.e., the “col-
lapsed” post-measurement state associated with “defi-
nite measurement results” if one chooses a suitable φinit
and U .
The association of “having measured x” with “being
in a state φ” is justified if physical theories are taken to
describe an ontological reality. We adopt the weaker po-
sition that physics provides us with descriptions gauged
by our (experimentally acquired) experience. Thus, we
start from the following two characteristics which we re-
gard as necessary (albeit not sufficient) for doing physics :
(C1) Physics strives for a (formal) description of the
world.
(C2) Experience provides the basis for normative judge-
ments about the correctness of the theory.
Then, the association expressed in (A) faces obstacles
that we examine in this note: How can a general, con-
textual theory establish reference to a particular system?
How can we expect to exhaustively describe the measure-
ment while maintaining its role in deciding about the
correctness of a theory? In light of these questions, the
statement (A) constitutes an implicit assumption neces-
sary to seeing a problem in the measurement.
In Section II, we recapitulate the measurement prob-
lem. In Section III, we raise issues around the notion
of a “system,” before we turn to the description of the
friend’s measurement in Section IV. Finally, in Section V,
we discuss the previously excavated assumption and its
import.
II. THE SETUP
When we refer to the Wigner’s-friend experiment, we
think of the following scenario: Wigner ensures that the
friend is ready to perform a measurement by means of a
measurement MF
W
.1 He then prepares a system S with
an initial measurement MS
W
and sends it to his friend.
The friend performs a measurementMS
F
on S. The joint
system S ⊗ F remains however isolated, and, therefore,
evolves unitarily. Finally, Wigner performs the measure-
ment MSF
W
on the joint system.
S
F
MS
W
MS
F
MF
W
MSF
W
unitary evolution/isolated system
Commonly, the measurement MS
W
is replaced by a
phrase of the sort “Wigner prepares a system in a
state φ ∈ H.” We grant Wigner the ability to choose
whether to send the system S to the friend or not condi-
tioned on the result of his measurement. Further, we al-
low for measurements such that eigenvalues to projectors
orthogonal to |φ〉〈φ| are different from the eigenvalue λ
1Subsequently, we adopt the following notation: The symbol MS
O
denotes a measurement performed by the observer O on the sys-
tem S. Note that we refer to an observer O by a capital letter:
In this regard, O is just another system and, thus, can be mea-
sured, too. If we refer to measurements on joint systems S⊗P , we
abbreviate MS⊗P
O
by MSP
O
.
2associated with φ. Thus, when “Wigner prepares S in
a state φ,” he merely sends S to his friend if the mea-
surement MS
W
yields the result λ. Similarly, the state-
ment “The friend is ready to perform his measurement.”
means that Wigner knows that “the friend is ready.” If
Wigner aims to describe his friend by means of quan-
tum mechanics, then he gets to know that “the friend is
ready” by performing a measurement MF
W
.
The measurement problem in this setup amounts to the
following: Quantum mechanics ostensibly allows for two
different descriptions of the friend’s measurement. For
suitably chosen measurements, these result in different
predictions for the probability distribution of Wigner’s
final measurement MSF
W
. If we ascribe one of these de-
scriptions to the friend, and the other to Wigner, then
we conclude that they disagree on the predictions for
Wigner’s final measurement. Straight solutions2 to the
measurement problem consist of restricting quantum me-
chanics as to not apply to measuring observers, to pre-
clude the system F to be isolated, to choose one of the
available descriptions as the correct one, or to embrace
the predictions of quantum mechanics as subjective.
In the following, we examine what it takes to “measure
that the friend is ready,” and what it takes to describe
his ensuing measurement. We consider first challenges
that arise within quantum mechanics and then issues that
affect any physical theory.
III. THE SYSTEM
The system S exposes issues with the physical systems
in general. Wigner and his friend must agree to refer to
the same system S. In the above scenario, this amounts
to Wigner reading off by means of his measurementMF
W
that the friend refers to the same S as he does. If the
friend is ready to “measure S,” then the friend “has S in
mind.” We have to add to (A) the following aspect:
(ASys) For an observer O referring to a system S, it is
sufficient that O is in a state φ for some φ ∈ HO.
Before examining whether a measurement can estab-
lish reference to a system, let us take a closer look at the
notion of a “system” itself.
The notion builds on the idea that we can talk about
a clearly confined part of the world around us, and dis-
tinguish it from other such parts. We assume a separa-
bility, i.e., the possibility to make statements about one
such part independent of other parts. Einstein places this
separability at the core of his understanding of physical
reality:3
2A straight solutions consists of “pointing out to the silly sceptic a
hidden fact he overlooked” [6, p. 69], i.e., that (at least) one of the
assumptions is unwarranted.
3We omit the following part of the quote, which, in light of non-
I just want to explain what I mean when I
say that we should try to hold on to phys-
ical reality. We are, to be sure, all of us
aware of the situation regarding what will
turn out to be the basic foundational con-
cepts in physics: the point-mass or the par-
ticle is surely not among them; the field, in
the Faraday-Maxwell sense, might be, but not
with certainty. But that which we conceive as
existing (‘actual’) should somehow be local-
ized in time and space. That is, the real in
one part of space, A, should (in theory) some-
how ‘exist’ independently of that which is
thought of as real in another part of space, B.
If a physical system stretches over the parts
of space A and B, then what is present in B
should somehow have an existence indepen-
dent of what is present in A. What is ac-
tually present in B should thus not depend
upon the type of measurement carried out in
the part of space, A; it should also be inde-
pendent of whether or not, after all, a mea-
surement is made in A. [. . . ] However, if
one renounces the assumption that what is
present in different parts of space has an in-
dependent, real existence, then I do not at all
see what physics is supposed to describe. For
what is thought to be a ‘system’ is, after all,
just conventional, and I do not see how one is
supposed to divide up the world objectively
so that one can make statements about the
parts. [10, §5 (translated quote from [11])]
Importantly, the ability to speak of separate systems does
not imply an “objective division” of the world. Einstein’s
reservations towards such a division go beyond a tempo-
ral inability to conceive such an objective division:
Terms that have proven useful for the order-
ing of things attain easily such an author-
ity over us so that we forget their worldly
origin and we accept them as unalterable
facts. They are, then, put down as ‘thinking-
necessities,’ ‘a priori given,’ etc. The path of
scientific progress is often made impassable
for a long time by such misconceptions. [12,
p. 102, own translation]
locality [7–9] is questionable. “If one adheres to this program, then
one can hardly view the quantum-theoretical description as a com-
plete representation of the physically real. If one attempts, never-
theless, so to view it, then one must assume that the physically real
in B undergoes a sudden change because of a measurement in A.
My physical instincts bristle at that suggestion.” [10, §5 (trans-
lated quote from [11])] We do not regard separability as sufficient
in the sense that measurements on parts, together with previously
shared information, reveal the results of any measurement that can
possibly be performed on the combined system.
3This joins Feyerabend’s [13, 14] and Kuhn’s [15] inves-
tigation into the history of science, refuting the idea of
an overarching convergent trend, with the considerations
by Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Rorty [16–18] on the con-
tingency of language. If we assume that there is neither
a final privileged language, i.e., a “truth out there” [18],
nor that we are able to “step outside the various vocab-
ularies we have employed” [18], then we must allow for
a Kuhnian paradigm shift, i.e., a radical re-description.
Adopting (A) and (ASys) is, in turn, a step towards as-
suming a privileged language, at the risk of petrifying
scientific discourse. But what supports this suspicion to-
wards the existence of, or convergence towards, an ulti-
mate language that reflects the truth out there other than
assuming uniformity in the history of science?4 What
suggests to repudiate (ASys)?
A. Isolated systems, decoherence, and
superselection rules
A problem with reference to systems is related to de-
coherence in the following sense: If Wigner observers a
non-unitary time evolution of S ⊗ F , then it is possi-
ble that the friend measures a system S′ bigger than S,
i.e., bigger than what Wigner thinks the system is. The
“escaping photon” leading to decoherence can be seen
as a problem of non-aligned reference: The photon is
contained in S′ but not in S. Conversely, we can see
decoherence—provided that we take it as inevitable inter-
action with the environment—as the inability to sharply
draw the boundary between one system and another, or
between one system and its environment. This perspec-
tive also challenges how we understand decoherence itself:
We cannot define decoherence as “a system interacting
with its environment” because there is no clear-cut dis-
tinction between “system” and “environment.” Thus,
decoherence is maybe better seen as the abandonment of
the notion of a well-confined system.
This also affects environment-induced superselection
rules. The program of “einselection” addresses the prob-
lem of many-worlds interpretations how to fix the basis
corresponding to measurement results, and, thus, how
“to split the worlds.” Einselection is not primarily con-
cerned with explaining how a single world splits into sys-
tems. Explaining the system-split yet poses a problem.
Superselection rules might provide a basis on which one
might attempt to divide the world into systems, against
Einstein’s above-mentioned concerns. These superselec-
tion rules cannot be induced by the environment,5 be-
cause it assumes the notion of a system already, leaving
4Arguments like the following-rule paradox against the existence of a
privileged language (see Section IVB) are based on the observation
that such uniformity is not warranted. Thus, historical arguments
are tainted.
5On a side-note, let us remark that the idea of “being induced by the
environment” resembles conceptually the epistemic idea of sense-
us with a circularity. We are similarly faced by circu-
larity, if we attempted to “measure” what qualifies as
a system, because “measuring” here means again “mea-
suring a system.” A way out is to supplement quantum
mechanics from the beginning by superselection rules.
The idea of introducing superselection rules has an-
other interesting consequence: If we regard contextual-
ity as an essential aspect of quantum mechanics [19–21],
then the superselection rules effectively undermine quan-
tum mechanics itself: With the superselection rules, we
introduce observables in the center of the orthomodular
lattice of allowed projectors P′(H), i.e., elements that
commute with all other elements in the lattice. This is
the cost of introducing a non-contextual notion of a sys-
tem into contextual theory [19]: There must be a Heisen-
berg cut, i.e., a line at which things become at least in
part classical. This might also affect the measurement
problem directly: If in the Wigner’s-friend experiment
the notion of a system was established by suitable super-
selection rules, not all of the measurements leading to the
contradiction are necessarily permitted. If, for instance,
the measurement MSF
W
with ambiguous probability pre-
dictions was precluded by the superselection rules, then
there would be no measurement problem.6
There are objections: Quantum mechanics with pos-
tulated superselection rules is not quantum mechanics.
Or, put otherwise, introducing superselection rules un-
dermines the assumption that quantum mechanics is uni-
versal.7 We are left with a problem: How can quantum
mechanics be universal and exhaustive without threat-
ening the notion of a system? How can quantum me-
chanics be without the notion of system? How can the
notion of a system avoid the above circularities without
supplementing the theory by such a notion and threaten-
ing its universality? This necessarily levels all particular
features of a particular system.8
IV. THE FRIEND
A. Quantum inquiries about intentions
Let us assume that, despite the above scepticism, there
are theoretical means to define a system, e.g., by a suit-
able set of superselection rules added to quantum me-
chanics. The question remains whether there can exist
an element ΠF
W
∈ P(HF ) that shows that “the friend
means to measure S”—that the friend “has S in mind.”
data: There is something given in our environment that induces us
to know (see later footnotes.)
6This reminds of the Bohmian restriction to position measurements.
7Consider the following extreme case: Let us assume the world is
entirely classical. Then, we might still describe it by a Boolean
sub-lattice of P(H). Is then quantum mechanics universal, given
that we have to restrict the quantum mechanical description to a
Boolean sub-lattice?
8See also the discussion in Section IVB.
4This question carries two intricacies: Can we find some-
thing inside the friend that reveals
(Itnt1) the friend’s reference to something outside of him,
and
(Itnt2) the friend’s intention to perform a measurement?
If we require that the friend’s intention to measure S is
before his actual contact with S, then we must expect
to read off this intention by merely measuring F , and
not S ⊗ F .
We examine the possibility of asking the more specific
question whether
(Itnt3) the friend intends to perform the measure-
ment ΠS
F
∈ P(HS).
If Wigner can inquire about such a question, and an-
swer it positively, then he can conclude that the friend
has the intention “to measure S.” It might be that one
measurement ΠF
W
with a suitable result reveals that the
friend intends to “perform the measurement Π on S for
some Π ∈ P ⊂ P(HS).” Let us, therefore, assume the
map
pi : P(HS)→ P(HF )
to formally capture the following: If Wigner can pos-
itively answer to ΠF
W
∈ P(HW ), then he can con-
clude that the friend intends to measure an element
in pi−1(ΠF
W
).
The friend does not intend to measure because we asked
him about it. Or, even worse, oscillate between different
intentions, as we change our inquiries.9 We, therefore,
demand that the image pi(P(Hs)) forms a distributive
9 In a sense, this is what we insinuated when we allowed for conclud-
ing from (Itnt3) to (Itnt1) and (Itnt2). To illustrate this, consider
the following situation: You offer your friend one scoop of ice-
cream, and you tell him to choose one flavor. To find out which
flavor he would like to have, you ask him the following two ques-
tions (arbitrarily many times and in arbitrary order): (Q1) “Do
you want chocolate ice-cream?” and (Q2) “Do you want vanilla
ice-cream?” If he now says consistently “yes” to one, and “no” to
the other, then you might conclude that he has a clear “intention.”
This conclusion is not justified if your friend gives changing an-
swers as you repeat these questions. If he says consistently “yes”
to both questions, then you doubt that he understood what you
meant with “choosing one flavor.” If he does not understand what
it means to “choose a flavour,” how can we conclude his intentions
from his answers to the questions (Q1) and (Q2)?
Even though we are getting a little ahead of ourselves here, let
us take this one step further and imagine that you give him a cone
with a scoop of ice-cream. Your friend starts eating or not. In the
case that the friend consistently gives a preference, and you offer
him the respective ice-cream, you expect him to starting eating
(and his face showing how he is enjoying it). Conversely, if you
offer him the other flavor, then he should not eat and rather insist
“But I meant chocolate ice-cream.” Now, if you offer him the type
that you concluded from his consistent answers to be his preference,
and he does not start eating, we can imagine the friend to say “Oh
sorry, I meant the vanilla.” or, angrily “But I meant chocolate.”
lattice avoiding that the friend “changes his mind” if we
ask him questions in a different order. Thus, pi effectively
collapses the non-distributive lattice P(HS) into a dis-
tributive sub-lattice of P(HF ). Thus, we re-encounter
the preferred basis problem of the many-worlds inter-
pretation and the “system” problem from Section III A:
We are required to postulate a distributive sub-lattice
that corresponds to “measuring intentions.” Suspecting
that the friend has “S in (his) mind” posits intentions as
non-contextual. As in Section III A, we encounter issues
anchoring non-contextual notions in a contextual theory
that is supposedly universally valid. Thus, we do not
have to go as far as the measurement problem for con-
textuality10 to get into the way of an exhaustive quantum
description.
B. Normativity and the nexus
between past and future
The above-developed scepticism relates more specifically
to quantum mechanics. The requirements (C1) and (C2)
give rise to another, more general doubt. Recall that (C1)
specifies the descriptive task of physics, while (C2) spec-
ifies that this description has to succumb to a normative
judgement. Kripke, when discussing Wittgenstein’s para-
dox of rule-following11, observes:
The relation of meaning and intention to fu-
ture action is normative, not descriptive. [6,
In the latter case you might learn that he (consistently) permutes
the words vanilla and chocolate. If your friend in the past always
asked for vanilla, and always ate it with joy, and you now skip the
question to directly offer him vanilla ice-cream, then he might still
not eat it, e.g., because today he “felt like chocolate,” and, thus, in-
tended to have chocolate ice-cream. In the case of the friend giving
changing answers, we can imagine that he (emotionlessly) eats the
ice-cream, unless he said “no” and you give him the respective fla-
vor nonetheless. Does this last case, despite being logically correct,
still qualify for “having chosen a flavor”? Now, one might oppose
that I deprived the friend of his emotions, to testify of his choice.
But then I can easily imagine him showing disgust, even if he eats
the logically correct flavor, e.g., because this chocolate ice-cream
is horrible. Did I now fiddle with the circumstances too much?
Should there not be a clear pattern, if we consider “normalized
conditions”? But how are these conditions characterized? By the
friend sticking to the logical rule? This leaves us with a circularity.
These are first steps towards the discussion in Section IVB.
10This takes contextuality as essential to the measurement problem
(see [22]).
11Wittgenstein summarizes: “This was our paradox: no course of
action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action
can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if
everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can
also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither
accord nor conflict here.” [23, §201] To put it in the words of the
example in Footnote 9, imagine that your friend in the past always
asked for vanilla ice-cream. We cannot tell whether he is following
a rule that dictates him to choose vanilla again, or a rule that lets
him change his choice for chocolate ice-cream this time, before he
has uttered his choice.
5p.37, emphasis in original]
On the one hand, this statement reflects on the above-
discussed reference to systems and the problem of Wigner
aligning his reference to his friend’s. On the other hand,
it foreshadows a similar problem with describing the
friends measurement—i.e., referring to the same mea-
surement that supposedly provides the normative experi-
ence. If we “interchangeably use the words ‘experience’,
‘observation,’ and ‘state of the observer’ ” [24], then we
remove the room for normative judgement. We effec-
tively postulate the theory to be true.12 In the following,
we elaborate on these concerns.
There is a link between Hume’s problem of induction
and Wittgenstein’s paradox of rule-following:
Both [Hume and Wittgenstein] develop a
sceptical paradox, based on questioning a cer-
tain nexus from past to future. Wittgen-
stein questions the nexus between past ‘inten-
tion’ or ‘meanings’ and present practice: for
example, between my past ‘intentions’ with
regard to ‘plus’ and my present computa-
tion ‘68+57=125’. Hume questions two other
nexuses, related to each other: the causal
nexus whereby a past event necessitates a fu-
ture one, and the inductive inferential nexus
from the past to the future. [6, p. 62, empha-
sis in original]
The link between the two can be explicated as: Nothing
in the friend’s past logically determines whether and how
the friend means to account for his experience in a mea-
surement. That is: Nothing in the friend’s past deter-
mines whether he intends to measure S or T , or whether
he thinks to have successfully performed a measurement,
or what result he obtained. Unless the friend’s particular
state a can be subsumed under a general categoryA. The
extension into the future of this general category is not
logically warranted [25]. Thus, all theories have a tenta-
tive character and we must resort to falsification [26].
The idea that quantum mechanics provides means to
exhaustively describe the friend’s measurement is to as-
sume that quantum mechanics provides the general cat-
egory that covers all future measurements. Then, how-
ever, the friend is no different from a brain-in-a-vat [27]:
Employing the separability assumption from above, we
can conclude that anything that we can say about the
friend, including his intentions and possible accounts of
experience, can be derived from the friend’s state. With
the help of some auxiliary environment T , we can simu-
late the friend’s measurement without ever putting him
in contact with S despite his alleged initial intentions
of measuring S.13 This renders the reference to the S
12This brings us back to reflect Einstein’s concerns about the passi-
bility on the path of scientific progress.
13We merely have to ensure the partial trace on HF to remain the
same.
that we struggled to ensure previously—as a necessary
requirement for qualifying the friends acts as a measure-
ment of S—invalid. The friend’s reference does not con-
form to our notion of “referring to S,” as in referring to
a particular system S. There does not seem to be a gen-
eral criterion for particular reference [28]. The problem
translates to any other observer, also to us:14 If there
is no principle difference between the friend and us, we
are thrown back to the question how we can ever refer
to anything outside ourselves, if we must suspect some
Wigner-like super-observer simulating us. Similarly, a
measurement is no more something we actually, or bet-
ter actingly, have a part in, but something that is said
about us.15 Is there then any measurement that could
provide us with the grounds to reject a theory as de-
manded in (C2)?
Kripke’s argument against functionalism can be seen
as a variant of the following-rule paradox. Translating
it to Wigner’s friend allows to explicate the issue. Let
us first summarize the argument laid out in [30]: If we
assume that physical computers can break down, then
we can also imagine the following scenario: If a physi-
cal computer computes F and breaks down, it actually
computes another function G. If, vice versa, a computer
computes G and breaks down, it actually computes the
function F .
x
computes F works normally
F (x)
x
computes G works normally
G(x)
breaks down
Thus, we are left with the following problem:
We cannot decide whether a physical
computer physically computes
{
F
G
}
,
and
{
works normally
breaks down
}
.
We can stipulate that the computer works fine, and con-
clude that it computes F or G. Or we stipulate that it
computes F , and conclude whether it works correctly or
breaks down. But we lack the means to fix both.
The problem translates to the friend and his reference
to systems S and T :
refers to S is right
refers to T is right
is mistaken
14If quantum mechanics fully describes the friend’s measure-
ment, what then is “reading this text” other than a quantum-
mechanically described observation?
15In this regard, “measuring” becomes “being said to measure,” ana-
logue to [29, $202].
6If the friend is mistaken, then he refers to the respective
other system.
We cannot decide whether the friend refers
to
{
S
T
}
, and is
{
right
mistaken
}
.
So as long as we allow the friend to be mistaken at
times—or dreaming, or hallucinating—, and this results
in swapping references, or measurements,
measures ΠS
F
is right
measures ΠS
F
′ is right
is mistaken
then we are faced with the problem of deciding what mea-
surement or what system the friend meant, and whether
he is right or mistaken. There is nothing we can expect
to find in the state of the friend that will definitely decide
both question at once. Again, we can stipulate that he
is dreaming and establish whether he is referring to S or
to T . Or we stipulate that he is referring to S and es-
tablish whether he is right or mistaken. The authority to
establish either of these stipulations is usually delegated
to a wider circle of persons that intersubjectively forms
an agreement.16
16We can draw a connection to Habermas’ criticism of positivism [31]:
If quantum mechanics is taken to yield an exhaustive description,
then the need for intersubjective agreement on norms is superflu-
ous. Language and science becomes private in a way that Habermas
regards intrinsic to Pierce’s pragmatism. “Peirce would have had to
come upon the fact that the ground of intersubjectivity in which in-
vestigators are always already situated when they attempt to bring
about consensus about metatheoretical problems is not the ground
of purpose-rational action, which is in principle solitary. [. . . ] It
is possible to think in syllogisms, but not to conduct a dialogue in
them. [. . . ] But the communication of investigators requires the
use of language that is not confined to the limits of technical control
over objectified natural processes. It arises from symbolic interac-
tion between societal subjects who reciprocally know and recognize
each other as unmistakable individuals. This communicative action
is a system of reference that cannot be reduced to the framework
of instrumental action.” [32, §6, p. 137, emphasis in original] With
the abandonment of intersubjectivity, Pierce cannot resort to a
community of scientist vouching for methodologic means to yield
certain knowledge as he effectively does: “Ontological propositions
about the structure of reality unintentionally elucidate the process
of mediation through which we come to know reality. Yet in fact
this concept of reality was first introduced only as the correlate of
a process of inquiry that guarantees the cumulative acquisition of
definitively valid statements. As soon as we remember this point of
departure, Scholastic realism of Peirce’s stamp can be seen through
as the ontologizing of an originally methodological problem. Indeed
for Peirce the problem of the relation of the universal and the par-
ticular presented itself outside of the tradition. That is, it appeared
not as a logical-ontological problem, but rather in connection with
the methodological concept of truth as a problem of the logic of in-
quiry.” [32, p. 109f, emphasis in in original] Irrespective of whether
one adheres to Habermas’ critical assessment of positivism or not,
the connection illustrates the epistemological import of assuming
an exhaustive language (see also Footnote 20).
In light of the challenges laid out above, we conclude:
The common reading of the measurement problem relies
on fully describing the friend’s measurement, thus remov-
ing the friend from the ground of intersubjectivity.17
The “problem” then consists in the incommensurabil-
ity of two different descriptions that quantum mechanics
allows for. The insistence that the measurement is a prob-
lem that needs a solution in form of another theory or an
appropriate reading of quantum mechanics implicitly de-
pends on removing the need to (intersubjectively) settle
normative questions.
What does this mean for the Wigner’s-friend experi-
ment? No matter the reading of quantum mechanics,18
an actual Wigner’s-friend experiment surprises if an iso-
lated system shows a collapse—irrespective of what or
who constitutes it: The surprise would be that we can
meaningfully call a system isolated despite it showing
a non-unitary evolution. Whatever evidence justifies us
to qualify the system as isolated is then at odds with
quantum mechanics. This takes S ⊗ F as just another
quantum system. Quantum mechanics is universal inso-
far as it can be applied to S ⊗ F . The “isolated friend”
does, however, not provide any contribution to intersub-
jectively agreeing on the correctness of the theory. What-
ever happens inside S ⊗ F is not a measurement that
provides the experience required in (C2).
Hume’s problem of induction shows that one can
hardly rely on uniformity to support general claims. As
such, the historical analysis of Feyerabend and Kuhn can-
not serve as reason to reject the assumption of an ex-
haustive language as this requires a uniformity of history
(see also Section III, in particular Footnote 4). The idea
that science aims for its own disintegration strikes us,
however, as odd: For, can we not really learn when we
have to listen carefully, or watch closely? When mere
description gives way to metaphorical disruption—“sud-
denly breaking off the conversation long enough to make
a face, or pulling a photograph out of your pocket and
displaying it, or pointing at a feature of the surroundings,
or slapping your interlocutors face, or kissing him?” [18,
§1] When experimental behavior is not covered by the
established description? When emitted electrons do not
get any faster if the intensity of light shun onto a metallic
plate is increased?
V. ASSUMPTIONS AND CONTINGENCIES
If one accepts that the nexus from the past to the fu-
ture poses an irreducible challenge (as discussed in Sec-
tion IV), then one accepts that the need for finding nor-
17This shows in an unquestioned use of phrases like the following
(see Section II): “If Wigner aims to describe his friend by means of
quantum mechanics, then he gets to know that ‘the friend is ready’
by performing a measurement MF
W
.”
18We consider GRW [33] to be a different theory [34].
7mative judgements persists. The contingency of our de-
scription of the world out there is not a contemporary
defect reflecting the inadequacy of our current descrip-
tion. In this perspective, the characteristic (C2) remains
an aspect of science.19 Science retains its room for cre-
ativity, and remains itself a creative activity [35]. These
observations carry a circularity as they take us back to
our starting point, i.e., the characteristic (C2) that we
ascribed to physics in the first place. Our arguments are
subject to the contingency of language as well. Thus, the
problems we see in seeing the measurement as a problem
are created as much as, in our regards, is any language,
at least in part. It seems that we must, at this point, re-
tract from declaring our assumptions as “weaker,” as we
initially did. Such a comparison seems hardly justified.
If, on the contrary, one sees the quest of physics to
excavate a truth out there, independent of any norma-
tive judgements or creative acts—a truth that imposes
itself—, then the assumptions (A) and (ASys) can hardly
be accepted as such, i.e., as assumptions. Identifying an
assumption is a reflection on the creative steps that facil-
itate one’s way of speaking: It constitutes the admission
that it could have been done otherwise.20 In this light,
it is only consequent that positivism removes such reflec-
tions (see [31]). We return to Wittgenstein’s observation
that the reader might not be easily convinced if he had
not had similar thoughts before. The ladder can merely
be climbed if one has already made the first steps onto
it (see [36, preface and §6.53]). Embracing the contin-
gencies of any language-game bars us from offering an
ultimate argument for the contingency of language.21
19With upholding (C2), we repudiate the empiricist reading: “Experi-
ence provides the basis for judgements about the correctness of the
theory.” We do not believe that, once we figure out the “language
of sense-data,” the room for normative judgements closes (see,
e.g., [17]).
20There is the possibility to regard assumptions as a temporary evil
until the evident foundations have been properly sorted out. Un-
til the assumption is turned into an inevitable conclusion of self-
imposing facts. This approach is, however, tainted by the tension
within the idea of “learning the self-imposing,” or, to put otherwise,
“to acquire an unaquired ability.” This is the core of Sellars incon-
sistent triad: “[classical sense-datum theories] are confronted by an
inconsistent triad made up of the following three propositions: A.
x senses red sense content s entails x non-inferentially knows that
s is red. B. The ability to sense sense contents is unacquired. C.
The ability to know facts of the form x is ø is acquired.” [17, §6]
21Putnam hints at this concern when he states: “Reichenbach, Car-
nap, Hempel, and Sellars gave principled reasons why a finite trans-
lation of material-thing language into sense-datum language was
impossible. Even if these reasons fall short of a strict mathemat-
ical impossibility proof, they are enormously convincing [. . . ]. In
the same spirit, I am going to give principled reasons why a finite
empirical definition of intentional relations and properties in terms
of physical/computational relations and properties is impossible—
reasons which fall short of a strict proof, but which are, I believe,
nevertheless convincing.” [28, §5]
VI. CONCLUSION
Straight solutions to the measurement problem suggest
that one has to choose among the available “interpre-
tations” of quantum mechanics. The common way of
putting the measurement problem is, however, itself
problematic: It relies on reducing science to pure de-
scription short of any normative elements. In particu-
lar, describing a measurement within a theory is faced
by the problematic traversing from the universal to the
particular—and back: How can reference to particular
systems be drawn from a general framework? How do
particular experiences warrant universal truths? More
generally, how is linguistic description possible without
establishing intersubjective agreement? We do not call
for definite answers to these questions. Any such answer,
we suspect, creates its own contingencies. We conclude,
however, that it is up to interpretation whether there is
a problem in the first place. We ask further, supposing
that there is a problem, whether it is the one that is
exposed in the common framing. Instead of inviting to
choose ones favorite “interpretation,” the “problem” asks
to reflect on what “doing physics” means.
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